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Understanding Contemporary Security: Potentials and Limitations in the 
Copenhagen School 
 
Abstract 
With a starting-point in global power reconfigurations and regional security challenges, this review 
examines the Copenhagen School’s contribution to the field of security studies. The review reflects 
on the Copenhagen School’s ability and potential to grasp contemporary security dynamics. It has a 
primary focus on the concepts of regional security complexes and securitization, Current literature 
on the theoretical concepts and methods used to conduct empirical studies are presented and reflected 
upon, with a primary focus on the concepts of regional security complexes and securitization. The 
review argues that there is a disparity between the Copenhagen School’s theoretical framework, its 
applied methods and its potential to grasp contemporary security dynamics. Conclusively, it argues 
that in spite of the Copenhagen School’s potential to understand contemporary security dynamics, 
three gaps need to be addressed in future research: the narrow perception of what and who contributes 
to the construction of security, an insufficient focus on transnational phenomena and the lack of an 
explicit set of methods to clarify how to examine, discuss and problematize specific securitizations 
and security dynamics. 
 
Keywords: The Copenhagen School, regional security complex, securitization, speech act, 
transnational threats  
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Introduction  
Changing power dynamics is a significant feature of the international system and various power 
reconfigurations have taken place in the contemporary world, consequently changing the relations 
between various actors (Rosenau 2000: 169).  
 
The Copenhagen School (CS) constitutes one of the most notable schools in security studies 
(Huysmans 1998: 480; Balzacq 2005: 171; Floyd 2007: 328; Stritzel 2007: 358) that has developed 
a theoretical framework addressing changing security dynamics. Fundamentally, it addresses the 
security relations after the Cold War and focuses specifically on regional rather than global security. 
Hence, it points to perceived reconfigurations of the global power structures relating to an increased 
prominence of the regional level (Buzan and Wæver 2003: 3). Thus, the CS deals specifically with 
the overall topic of global power reconfigurations and regional security challenges.  
 
Barry Buzan contributed to the foundation of the CS with his publication People, States and Fear 
(1983)1, where he sought to nuance the field of security studies. He did this by broadening the concept 
of security by introducing the notion of sectors. The incorporation of sectors, such as the 
environmental, societal and economic, highlights the importance of understanding security as more 
than the use of force and territorial integrity of states (Buzan 1991: 19f).  
The CS and its scholars have in several publications explored the dynamics of security. Buzan, 
together with Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde published the book Security: A New Framework for 
Analysis in 1998, exploring the dynamics of regional security as part of the wider security agenda 
and the securitization approach in which discourse analysis has a significant role (Buzan et al. 1998: 
4f, 176f). Subsequently, Wæver and Buzan published a third book, Regions and Powers: The 
Structure of International Security in 2003, which presents the Regional Security Complex Theory 
(RSCT). More specifically, it presents a framework to analyze regional security dynamics that 
combines the previously introduced concepts of sectors, securitization as well as materialist notions 
of territory and distribution of power, thus drawing from both a constructivist and neorealist approach 
(Buzan and Wæver 2003: 4). When reviewing the work of the CS, we have found that the third book 
has remained rather uncontroversial, while the first two books have received wide acclaim but also 
critique. This is for instance illustrated in a special issue of Security Dialogue published in 2011, 
which includes a series of articles that discuss the CS’ theoretical framework almost a decade after 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!
1 Revised in a second edition from 1991, which is the edition included in this review.!
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the latest publication of the book. However, the articles mainly focus on the concept of securitization. 
Furthermore, the CS has featured continuously in academic journals in which they have defended and 
elaborated on their theories and especially on the concept of securitization2. Hereby, the theories of 
the CS are still being actively researched and specified and other scholars are continuously using the 
framework developed by the CS3.  
 
In the following literature review, we will contribute to the debate on the CS by presenting the overall 
argument that there is a disparity between the Copenhagen School’s theoretical framework, their 
applied methods and their potential to grasp the security dynamics in the contemporary world. We 
will introduce and discuss the theory and methods related to the concepts of securitization, sectors 
and Regional Security Complexes (RSCs); the three fundamental concepts in the CS’ framework 
(Wilkinson 2007: 6; McDonald 2008: 582). Our focus will be on the three books mentioned above, 
as these elaborate on the concepts of securitization, sectors and RSCs. When referring to the CS, we 
refer to the three scholars and authors of the main publications; Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde.  
 
Throughout this review, we argue that the CS has a potential to understand contemporary security 
dynamics but especially three gaps relating to the theory, empirical scope and methods need to be 
addressed in future research. First, securitization has to be perceived as constituted by more than a 
speech act and encompass a practical dimension accounting for non-linguistic articulations that might 
also contribute to a specific securitization. This gap is largely a product of theoretical tensions 
between the CS and various scholars concerning the concept of securitization. Second, the somewhat 
state-centered focus is insufficient to fully comprehend the contemporary dynamics of transnational 
threats. While we acknowledge the importance of the regional level, we emphasize how transnational 
actors and threats in the contemporary world is of greater importance than the CS posits. Third, even 
though the CS presents a wide theoretical framework, we have found that there is a need for more 
explicit methods to validate the findings of the school, as transparent methodological tools are 
quintessential in order to further the research agenda. These three gaps therefore underline our overall 
argument that there is a disparity between the theoretical framework, contemporary security dynamics 
and the applied methods.  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!
2 Buzan and Wæver (1997); Wæver (1999); Buzan and Wæver (2009); Wæver (2011); Wæver (2015).!
3Cf. Huysmans (2000); Abrahamsen (2005); Hansen and Nissenbaum (2009); Kirchner and Berk (2010); Yamin 
(2013); Hanreider and Kreuder-Sonnen (2014); Malmvig (2014); Smith (2014); Donnelly (2015); Maltby (2015); 
Stritzel and Chang (2015); Troitskiy (2015). !
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In the following, we will first present the theoretical framework focusing on the concepts of 
securitization, sectors and RSCs. Second, we will categorize and identify the main methods applied 
by the CS and by scholars that use the CS framework. Lastly, we will present the three gaps and argue 
that this should be the focus for future research. 
 
Theoretical Section 
The purpose of this section is to present the theoretical framework of the CS. We will firstly introduce 
the theory of securitization, including the work on sectors, and secondly the RSCT. The origins of 
their central notions will be emphasized and the key contributors and critiques to the main works by 
Buzan and Wæver will be presented.  
 
Securitization 
What is arguably the most notable concept of the CS is the notion of securitization. It provides an 
understanding of who securitize what threats and for whom with the help of language theory (Wæver 
1995: 55). Securitization is characterized as a speech act that places an issue above normal politics 
by presenting a security issue as an existential threat that can only be addressed with extraordinary 
measures. Furthermore, the security issue must be recognized as a threat by a relevant audience. 
(Wæver 1995: 55; Buzan et al. 1998: 26) Hence, the central focus is how an issue is declared as an 
existential threat to a referent object (the object that is existentially threatened) by a securitizing actor 
(the actor in charge of constructing the threat) (Buzan et al. 1998: 36).  
 
Securitization was first introduced by Wæver (1995), but in Security: A New Framework for Analysis 
(1998), Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde contextualize the concept within the broader framework of the 
CS. As such, securitization reflects the attempt by the CS to transcend the otherwise narrow focus in 
security studies that limits itself to study war and military force (ibid.: 4). Rather, security in the CS 
is perceived as:  
 
“(…) a self-referential practice, because it is in this practice that the issue becomes 
a security issue – not necessarily because a real existential threat exists but because 
the issue is presented as such a threat” (ibid.: 24)  
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Thereby, securitization is an intersubjective, social process where the perception of a threat is the 
central issue. When defining securitization in this way, Buzan and Wæver draw on Arnold Wolfers 
to emphasize the distinction between taking a subjective or objective approach to security. In other 
words, through this distinction, it is argued that securitization is an inherently intersubjective process 
and that security threats are constructed rather than having an objective existence. (ibid.: 30f) Wæver 
conceptualized the concept of securitization in 1995, where he also introduced the concept of 
desecuritization, albeit barely mentioned.  
In the framework, security is largely negative in the sense that by articulating an issue as part of a 
perceived security issue, it moves beyond normal politics (ibid.: 29). As such, securitization can be 
perceived as an intensification of politicization and desecuritization as an attempt to place an issue 
back in normal politics (ibid.). Hence, the distinction between the ‘political’ and the ‘non-political’ 
is very pertinent in the CS’ framework. However, the fact that the CS perceives securitization as 
relying on a distinction between everyday politics and emergency measures has been criticized by for 
instance Scott Watson of ignoring the security practices that emerge below the level of emergency 
politics (Watson 2011: 7). 
 
Still, the securitization theory has been acknowledged for its significant contribution in adding to the 
understanding of security and construction by incorporating discourse analysis into the study of 
security studies (McSweeney 1996: 82; Hansen 2000: 288; Balzacq 2005: 171). However, it has also 
been criticized due to its rigid focus on speech acts (Huysmans 1998: 493; Williams 2003: 526f; 
Balzacq 2005: 171; McDonald 2008: 563f). This, among other things, predominantly gives attention 
to linguistic political articulations (McDonald 2008: 564). Furthermore, while scholars such as 
Thierry Balzacq acknowledges the contribution of the CS to security studies, he argues in his 2005 
article, that there are vital aspects to the theory that Buzan et al. have overlooked. Balzacq argues that 
securitization should account for historical trajectories, which is not included in the work done by 
Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998). He thus emphasizes the complexity of the securitization process, 
which he argues is not adequately grasped when only analyzing the speech act itself (Balzacq 2005: 
193). Balzacq further argues how the concept of audience remains unaccounted for: "(…) language 
has an intrinsic force that rests with the audience’s scrutiny of truth claims (...)" (ibid.: 173). He thus 
argues that the audience is more crucial to a successful securitization of a threat than the CS asserts 
(ibid.). Even though scholars such as Balzacq (2005), Michael C. Williams (2003) and Jef Huysmans 
(2006) point to limitations in the CS’ theories, they also elaborate further on the framework.  
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In his 2011 piece, Wæver further emphasizes how securitization is a way of handling a security issue, 
arguing that the very quality of a security issue lies within its management and not the threat itself. 
As a response to previous critique, he argues how the justification for securitization must contain a 
“discourse ethics criteria” (Wæver 2011: 473). He elaborates on this aspect by pointing to three acts 
an actor must perform to justify the measures taken in a case of emergency: “it must establish (1) 
that there is a threat; (2) that the threat is potentially existential; and (3) the possibility and relative 
advantages of security handling compared to non-securitized handling” (ibid.).  
 
The continued development of the theory of securitization is reflected in Buzan and Wæver’s 
inclusion of the concept of macrosecuritization in 2009; a concept that had been mentioned earlier by 
Buzan in 2006. Macrosecuritization is an understanding of a securitization existing above the state 
level, although it does not necessarily have a global span (Buzan and Wæver 2009: 255f). This reflects 
that Buzan and Wæver acknowledge that the sole focus on the state-level in securitization analysis is 
“rather like crude realist thinking” with its focus on national security concerns based on “materialist 
calculations of threats” (ibid.: 256). The space analyzed in a macrosecuritization is constituted by 
larger secular or religious universal ideologies’ impact on securitization. Therefore, 
macrosecuritization is a large number of individual securitizations being bound together for a longer 
period of time (ibid.). The prime example according to Buzan and Wæver is the Cold War, since it is 
easy to observe how states became bound together in East and West divisions (ibid.: 257f).  
 
While the CS arguably has contributed to the field of security studies with their seemingly originality 
of their theory, it draws some of its assumptions and methods on the previous work of political theorist 
Carl Schmitt’s political theology and the philosopher John Austin’s concept of speech act, also 
emphasized by Williams (2003: 515). Following the logic of Austin, one of the conditions for a 
successful speech act is the internal and external dynamics, meaning the linguistic and social 
conditions that create a legitimate articulation of the act taking the position of the securitizing actor 
into account (Buzan et al. 1998: 32f)4.  
 
The inspiration from Schmitt and the realist tradition is described in William’s critical appraisal 
review from 2003, in which he argues that the construction of external threats and securitization draws 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!
4!This is also termed ‘facilitating conditions’ (Buzan et al. 1998: 32f).!
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on Schmitt’s emphasis on the state and its use of the logic of war to protect its sovereignty (Williams 
2003: 515f). The central feature of how threats only are made effective by an authoritative speech act 
of an existential threat (Buzan et al. 1998: 26) arguably emanates from Carl Schmitt’s understanding 
of political order. Especially his emphasis on how politics are defined by patterns of amity and 
enmity, as well as his definition of the existentially threatening enemy (Schmitt 2002: 60), shares 
similarities with the CS’ concepts. It thus creates a case of emergency where only the sovereign can 
decide whether there is an extreme emergency and which measures to take (ibid.: 89). This is echoed 
in the CS' emphasis on the conditions of a successful speech act as being socially effective only when 
there is someone in a powerful position to construct it as such (Buzan et al. 1998: 32). Williams 
argues how the previously mentioned feature of securitization as the movement of an issue above 
normal politics is another central aspect in which the securitization framework is inspired by 
Schmitt’s work, as it draws on the distinction between a political issue and a non-political issue 
(Williams 2003: 515f). 
 
Wæver responded to the claim of securitization theory being closely related to Schmitt in his 2011 
article by attempting to refute any notion of the theory involving Schmitt’s concept of politics:  
 
“The concept of security is Schmittian, because it defines security in terms of 
exception, emergency and decision (…) This does not in itself make securitization 
theory’s concept of politics Schmittian, because the place of security in the theory 
is as an anti-politics or the politically constituted limit to politics” (Wæver 2011: 
478, footnote 2).  
 
Hereby, Wæver argues that securitization theory differentiates itself from the Schmittian concept of 
politics, because it does not concern itself with politics as such; the CS rather concerns itself with the 
level above normal politics.   
 
Sectors 
With the notion of sectors, the CS has developed an analytical category that is useful when “(...) 
identifying specific types of interaction”, thus facilitating analysis by reducing complexity (Buzan et 
al. 1998: 7f). Five types of sectors have been identified: the military, the political, the societal, the 
economic and the environmental (ibid.: 7). In each sector the reference object varies as there are 
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multiple understandings of what is being threatened. Even though there are no pre-given reference 
objects, the military sector usually has the state as a reference object, whereas collective identity 
usually constitutes the reference object in the societal sector (ibid.: 22f). Hence, they distinguish their 
theory from more traditional security theories by encompassing a multi-sectoral approach to security 
(ibid.: 3, 7f). 
 
Furthermore, in an article published two years after Security: A Framework of analysis (1998), 
Wæver together with Carsten Bagge Laustsen further explored the concept of sectors and argued in 
favor of a sixth sector of religion encompassing culture and identity. The sector of religion thus 
became a part of the framework of securitization (Laustsen and Wæver 2000: 707) and has been 
applied in empirical studies (cf. Malmvig 2014). The advantages of incorporating this sector is 
derived from the acknowledgment that post-Cold War conflicts and wars have been increasingly 
driven by tensions between cultures and identities and less by classical understandings of power 
mechanisms (Laustsen and Wæver 2000: 705).  
 
A critique of the sometimes rigid perception of sectors is formulated in Michelle Pace’s book: The 
Politics of Regional Identity: Meddling with the Mediterranean from 2006. Pace argues that the CS’ 
work with various sectors is widely acknowledged to broaden the security agenda as it enables an 
inclusion of non-state referent objects to security studies. However, she points to critiques by other 
scholars who argue that the CS should also examine what the term security actually signifies (Pace 
2006: 7). Furthermore, she argues that the distinction between the sectors leads to a neglect of an 
analysis of a potential overlap between them (ibid.). Another, more prominent critique in relation to 
sectors, is raised by Bill McSweeney. He argues that societal security constructs society as having a 
single identity, which simplifies the diversity and fluidity of social identities as these are constantly 
negotiated between people and interest groups (McSweeney 1996: 85).  
 
Regional Security Complexes  
Security complexes and the importance of the regional level in security studies was already mentioned 
in People, States and Fear (1991) and Security: A New Framework for Analysis (1998) but in Regions 
and Powers (2003), Buzan and Wæver elaborates on RSCs as part of their framework. Here, they 
draw a distinction between the regional and the global level and thereby emphasize the importance 
of the regional level in international security. 
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Buzan and Wæver’s RSCT offers a framework that enables one to analyze, anticipate and explain 
developments in a region (Buzan and Wæver 2003: 40). In their work, Buzan and Wæver subscribe 
to a regionalist perspective on international security, thus distinguishing themselves from neo-realism 
represented by Kenneth Waltz and the globalist perspective represented by David Held (ibid.: 6f). In 
the regionalist approach, both elements from the neorealist and globalist approaches are, however, 
incorporated as it focuses on both the anarchic structure of global politics and the domestic dynamics 
influencing global politics (ibid.: 10f). Following the neorealist assumption of an anarchical 
structured international system, RSCs become a substructure of the system that influences global 
power dynamics of great power polarity and their functioning in the international system (ibid.: 40). 
The CS incorporates part of the neorealist perspective by applying Waltz’ concepts of structure, but 
their scope is wider; they focus on additional structural aspects than those of Waltz and put emphasis 
on a constructivist understanding of patterns of amity and enmity, that determine the relations 
between the actors in an RSC, as well as securitization processes (ibid.: 6f). This perspective is to 
some extent characterized by materialism and state-centrism as it downplays the role of transnational 
phenomena, such as international terrorism and globalization (ibid.: 11). This will be elaborated in 
the section on gaps and tensions. It further subscribes to the logic of the balance of power as affecting 
the relations and interactions between states in the global system (ibid.: 6).  
 
Buzan and Wæver’s regionalist perspective is similar to the assumptions of David A. Lake and Patrick 
M. Morgan in Regional Orders (1997). Here, Lake and Morgan assert that the post-Cold War period 
is characterized by a more autonomous regional level that is therefore increasingly central to an 
analysis of security studies (Lake and Morgan 1997: 6f; Buzan and Wæver 2003: 10). However, the 
CS perceives security as wider than the traditional understanding that Lake and Morgan represent. 
Moreover, the CS distinguish themselves from Lake and Morgan by arguing that memberships in 
RSCs are mutually exclusive and not overlapping (Buzan and Wæver 2003: 48). In continuation 
hereof, RSCT is built on two assumptions. Firstly, that the post-Cold War period is defined by a 
decline in superpower rivalry, which has led to a decrease in global powers taking an active part in 
the management of other areas of the world. Secondly, great powers are now what Buzan and Wæver 
refer to as ‘lite powers’. This implies that the dynamics of the domestic level determine and limit the 
great power interests abroad, pulling them away from military engagement and leading them toward 
less interference in other areas of the world. (ibid.: 10f)  
! 10!
The authors emphasize how an RSC is formed by the interplay between both the anarchic structure 
and balance of power consequences and the pressures from what is geographically proximate. The 
latter emphasizes how the adjacency of states tend to facilitate more security interactions between the 
actors in the region. (ibid.: 45) Drawing from complex interdependence theory, the RSCT 
incorporates the idea that states are entangled in a web of security interdependence, but contrary to 
the neoliberal notion of interdependence, it is far from being stable as the proximity of states are often 
marked by insecurity (ibid: 46). There is a link between RSCs and global powers, as powers outside 
the RSCs configure security arrangements with states within an RSC through the mechanism of 
penetration (ibid.). Furthermore, in relation to the CS’ focus on the importance of geographic 
adjacency, the authors argue that patterns of enmity and amity are best interpreted at the regional 
level as both patterns of fear and harmony are created inside the region. Hereafter, the analysis can 
be extended to global and domestic actors (ibid.: 47). However, it is important to stress that the main 
actors remain states (ibid.: 11). To some extent, the continued focus on states as primary actors leaves 
the RSCT state-centric and materialistic deterministic in its perception of power despite its 
constructivist emphasis on how the distribution of power and the patterns of amity and enmity are 
independent variables (ibid.: 4).  
 
Recapitulation 
In this section, we have accounted for the work of the CS, most notably Buzan and Wæver, and the 
main contributors to the debate on the CS’ framework. The school has contributed to and broadened 
the field of security studies by introducing a constructivist approach to the field with the concept of 
securitization that is constituted by speech acts and sectors. Therefore, the theory has the potential to 
grasp other security issues than those that are materially constituted, wherefore it moves beyond the 
political and military sector of security. Besides merely outlining and showing the development of 
the CS, we have also shown the recognition of the theories and concepts of the CS and the central 
critique has been uncovered; the general critique being that the CS remains rather narrow in their 
perception of security relations and securitization because of the focus on emergency matters above 
the normal political level, which consequently neglects the complexity of the securitization process. 
Additionally, we have shown that the theoretical framework draws on various scholars; the core 
concept of securitization builds on inspiration from earlier work by Schmitt and Austin.  
As the CS’ theory of securitization and RSCs have been presented, it has become evident how their 
theories are continuously evolving, with for example the introduction of macrosecuritization. 
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Building on this section, it seems pertinent to identify and categorize the main methods applied in 
relation to the theoretical framework. This will be the focus in the following section.  
 
Methods Section 
In the following section, we will present and elaborate on the methods used in relation to the concepts 
of securitization and RSCs. We will also present other scholars’ contribution to the methods of the 
CS through these scholars’ empirical work. Additionally, we will locate and present the critique that 
the CS’ methods have fostered, which will function as a transition to the section on gaps and tensions, 
where the critique will be elaborated. Firstly, it will be explained how the CS through their methods 
investigate the construction of global threats through the framework of securitization, focusing on the 
methods of single case studies and linguistic analysis of acts. Secondly, we examine the empirical 
research conducted in relation to RSCT, focusing on the incorporation of securitization, multilevel 
studies, historical trajectories and the potential of comparing and predicting future scenarios. 
 
Securitization 
Single Case Securitization Analyses  
In the following, it will be described through which methods the concept of securitization, has been 
applied to specific empirical studies. Throughout our research process, it has appeared difficult to 
locate the specific methods applied by Buzan and Wæver and to analyze the concrete discourses they 
identify in their securitization analyses. This consequently influences the transparency of their 
methods and the implications of this will be elaborated on in the third section of this review.  
 
When the CS study securitizations, they examine them by conducting discourse analysis. As part of 
the discourse analysis, they first identify a securitizing concept (Wæver 2011: 476f), such as the 
Global War on Terror (GWoT) (Buzan 2006). Secondly, referent objects are identified and thirdly, 
the very process of legitimation, or what Wæver refer to as the “moment of securitization”, is 
examined (Wæver 2011: 476f). This can also be seen in a case study by Watson on the humanitarian 
responses to the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004. Watson identifies humanitarianism as a security 
discourse and examines the “human as a referent object” as well as how it is discursively constructed 
by certain privileged actors through for instance articles and television news in order to legitimize the 
vast amount of humanitarian aid (Watson 2011: 13). This method of identifying securitizing concepts, 
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referent objects and examining legitimization processes has been applied to various types of other 
perceived transnational threats by the CS and other scholars5. 
 
The Role of Actors in the Analyses  
The role played by actors in securitization studies, and the implications of this understanding of an 
actor, is a relevant aspect to examine. This is because the CS examines securitization as a “self-
referential practice”, meaning that security issues do not have any objective meaning before it is 
articulated as such by dominant actors (Buzan et al. 1998: 24): “Security is articulated only from a 
specific place, in an institutional voice, by elites.” (Wæver 1995: 57).  
Matt McDonald criticizes the focus on dominant actors for having the implication of excluding other 
potential influential actors with the consequence that alternative security discourses are overlooked 
(McDonald 2008: 573ff). Lene Hansen, who also study securitizations in her case studies, can be 
argued to remedy this problem. Hansen introduces the concept of gendered security to an empirical 
study in order to incorporate the voices of those who are excluded from the debate, here women 
(Hansen 2000: 294; 296f). Hansen thereby broadens the perception of actors that might influence 
securitizations and argues that it is necessary to include the marginalized voices in Buzan and 
Wæver’s epistemology (ibid.: 289).  
 
Speech Acts 
The constructivist backdrop in the theory of the CS has great implications, especially in relation to 
the concept of the speech act. As mentioned in the theoretical section, this is a concept that is 
significant for the understanding of securitization, making it an essential concept to investigate. 
 
First and foremost, the methods the CS applies when investigating securitization is discourse analysis 
of speech acts, which emphasizes the importance of linguistics in the construction of a threat. 
Applying a discourse analytical approach, when analyzing threats, enables the CS to observe security 
issues as discursive practices (Wæver 2011: 473). This approach can be seen in Buzan’s article “Will 
the ‘global war on terrorism’ be the new Cold War?” (2006). Here, Buzan uses the analysis of 
securitization to enable a constructivist and dynamic understanding of the nature of the threat of 
terrorism as presented in the GWoT rhetoric (Buzan 2006: 1102). The article hereby analyzes how 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!
5See for example Huysmans (2000); Abrahamsen (2005); Buzan (2006); Hansen and Nissenbaum (2009); Floyd (2010),!
Hanreider and Kreuder-Sonnen (2014); Malmvig (2014); Donnelly (2015); Stritzel and Chang (2015).!
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terrorism is framed and used politically: “Washington is now embarked on a campaign to persuade 
itself, the American people and the rest of the world that the ‘global war on terrorism’ (GWoT) will 
be a ‘long war’” (ibid.: 1101). This is an example of the centrality of speech acts in the methods 
applied to securitization analysis; the long war rhetoric influences the conception of the threat and 
the emergency measures it necessitates. In this article, Buzan analyzes speech acts by focusing on 
power authorities and on political leaders as the securitizing actors constructing the discourse. As 
such, he draws on the method of discourse analysis outlined in Security: A New Framework for 
Analysis (Buzan et al. 1998: 176f). This approach has been modified by various scholars in their 
empirical studies. Some examples of the most prominent scholars will briefly be presented in the 
following. These specific examples are chosen in order to show the great variety in the use of 
securitization.  
 
Frank Möller extends the CS’ focus on linguistic discursive practice in his empirical study, where he 
incorporates visual culture to his securitization analysis, when he analyzes images’ influence on 
policies post-9/11 (Möller 2007). Hansen (2011) likewise emphasizes the notion of visual 
securitization when she examines the Mohammed Cartoons’ influence on securitization processes 
and how images contribute to written and oral discourses. Hereby, Möller and Hansen can be argued 
to remedy the issue of only analyzing discourses stemming from speech acts, by broadening the field 
of discursive constructions with visual representations. As such, this point supplements the critique 
of the CS highlighted in the theoretical section (cf. Theoretical Section - Securitization).   
 
Huysmans (2006, 2011) further extends the empirical focus of the CS by examining new forms of 
securitizations that are less centered on speech acts and he modifies the concept to include ‘security 
techniques’ (Huysmans 2006: 9). With this modification, he extends the understanding of what should 
be taken into account when examining the discourse of securities by incorporating technological and 
technocratic knowledge in the framing of political issues (Huysmans 2011: 372). The basis for 
selection of empirical material thus becomes wider, which can ensure an incorporation of more actors 
and methods.  
In relation to this, Wæver (2011) revised the empirical ground when conducting analyses of 
securitizations. He argued for incorporating a new dimension of political consequences in the analysis 
of securitizations (Wæver 2011: 476f). Herewith, the identification of the effects of a securitization 
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is also considered when analyzing securitization processes, which extends the empirical ground when 
conducting analyses of securitization.  
 
Regional Security Complexes 
In Regions and Powers (2003), Buzan and Wæver introduce the RSCT and apply this theoretical 
framework to a number of RSC-cases. As was the case with securitization, Buzan and Wæver are not 
themselves very explicit about the methods used in RSCT. Therefore, the following review of the 
applied methods will represent our evaluation of the case studies in Regions and Powers (2003) and 
case studies by other scholars using the CS’ framework. These studies have been selected to illustrate 
the various methods applied in relation to RSCT. We have identified the primary method to be case 
studies, examined through securitization, multilevel studies, a historical trajectory, comparison 
between regions and the potential of prediction in relation to the RSCs.  
 
Securitization as a Part of Regional Security Complexes 
The concept and method used to analyze securitization is also important in the RSCT, since: ”(…) 
some autonomy is left for the acts of securitization by actors in the region. The pattern formed by 
these acts defines the RSC” (Buzan and Wæver 2003: 72). This indicates that tracing securitizations 
is important for understanding the constitution of an RSC, which is underlined by the fact that RSCs 
are studied through the examination of security discourses and practices (ibid.: 76).  
Buzan and Wæver, however, note that since they in Regions and Powers (2003) aim at a broad global 
overview, it is not possible to study the specific dynamics in each securitization. Instead, they 
generalize securitizations by using broad indicators such as war, arms races and other emergency 
measures. Contrary to the single case securitization studies, this work is not characterized by in-depth 
linguistic analyses. (ibid.: 73) 
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Multilevel Analysis of Case Studies 
According to Buzan and Wæver, the RSCT enables descriptive area studies (ibid.: 53), in which a 
distinction between levels is important. The focus in their empirical research is the four levels that 
create a security constellation: the domestic, state-to-state, inter regional and the global level (ibid.: 
51). A practical example of how this functions can for instance be seen in the case of the South Asian 
RSC, which is analyzed through tracking different patterns of amity and enmity on the four levels 
and the possibility for transformations within the RSC (ibid.: 126ff). Hereby, it could be argued that 
this method enables them to incorporate various multilevel relations that might affect a region in 
global politics.  
 
An empirical approach emphasizing multiple levels’ influence on the regional level, has been adopted 
by other scholars analyzing regional cases through the framework of RSCT6. Saira Yamin for instance 
claims that challenges to governance and security in Afghanistan derives from “(...) domestic, 
regional and global influences (...)” (Yamin 2013: 145). Firstly, she evaluates the domestic scene 
and state building in Afghanistan (ibid.: 145ff) with the support of a descriptive statistical analysis 
incorporating for instance reported empirical data on security incidents (ibid.: 149). Hereafter, the 
regional level is analyzed incorporating the actions of global powers. Here, the method enables a 
description of conflictual relations within the region and actions taken by actors in the region, such 
as the signing of strategic partnerships (ibid.: 156). Hereby, the objective is to deduct a complete 
picture of the region from the historic conflictual patterns on several levels.  
 
Analysis Incorporating Historical Trajectories 
The analytical method applied in the RSC case studies is centered on regional historical trajectories 
focusing on patterns of amity and enmity in order to explain the current situation of the RSCs (see 
for example Buzan and Wæver 2003: 101ff, 187ff, 304ff, 345ff). The historical tracking mainly 
addresses recent times and especially the Cold War in the sense that many of the case studies is 
divided between an analysis of the RSC during and after the Cold War (see for example ibid.: 101ff, 
187ff, 343ff). Here, it should be noted that this is not a historical analysis in the same way that would 
be conducted by historians using archival research and source criticism. In continuation hereof, Buzan 
and Wæver are not as such clear about which sources they use in order to present the historical events 
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6!See for example Kirchner and Berk (2010), Yamin (2013), Smith (2014); Troitskiy (2015).!
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that they deduct their conclusions from. Consequently, it remains unspecified whether their studies 
build on document analysis, interviews or other kinds of methods.  
 
Incorporating historical trajectories as part of the analysis has further inspired regional case studies 
conducted by other scholars. Keith Smith (2014) for instance explicitly uses RSCT in analyzing the 
US foreign policy regarding the Persian Gulf. Like the analysis by Buzan and Wæver (2003), Smith 
focuses on patterns of enmity and amity by drawing on existing literature on the regional history 
(Smith 2014: 7ff). Furthermore, the empirical material includes statements by for instance the 
Secretary of State and state leaders (ibid.: 8, 12), thus highlighting how not just actions but also 
rhetorics play an important role in foreign policy analysis when using the RSCT.  
 
Evgeny F. Troitskiy’s case study of the Central Asian RSC, which is a comparative policy analysis 
between the foreign policy of the US and Russia towards central Asia (Troitskiy 2015: 2) also presents 
a historical trajectory (ibid.: 6, 11). However, it differs from the case studies presented in Regions 
and Powers (2003) as Troitskiy more directly incorporates document analysis through the analysis 
of governmental publications and for instance analyze the discourses of American policy makers 
(ibid.: 7, 12, 20). This is a method that seems widespread in the case studies inspired by the CS as 
Yamin likewise deducts reasonings from for example the signing of agreements when predicting the 
situation in Afghanistan post-2014 (Yamin 2013: 156). What is evident in these types of case studies 
is that it is mainly the actions by, and statements from, official and important political voices that is 
used as relevant empirical material. Yamin for instance includes a statement by the, at the time of 
writing, Secretary General for NATO, Anders Fogh Rasmussen (ibid.: 150) and Smith compliments 
his analysis with statements made by significant US politicians (Smith 2014: 12). Other case studies 
incorporate different sources of empirical data, while still emphasizing the role of privileged actors, 
by including interviews with government officials supplementing for example government 
publications in their empirical analysis (cf. Kirchner and Berk 2010; Maltby 2015). This method of 
deducting conclusions from qualitative material is in some case studies supplemented with 
quantitative data, which is illustrated in Yamin’s study (Yamin 2013: 149).  
This shows how the RSCT, as presented by Buzan and Wæver, enables various case studies using 
numerous methods, which is arguably made possible because the RSCT introduces a universal set of 
methods: More or less the same method has been applied to the different RSCs presented in Regions 
and Powers (2003). However, the analyses of the specific case studies are not completely similar as 
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the two scholars have allowed for the specificities of each case to determine the structure of analysis 
(Buzan and Wæver 2003: 443).  
 
Potential of RSCT: Comparison and Prediction 
Buzan and Wæver argue that the RSCT presents a useful framework for comparative case studies as 
the different regions are compared in relation to for example the role of non-state actors, the role of 
great powers and the influence of the global level (ibid.: 468ff). This comparative method also 
illustrates the element of categorization that is evident in the case studies as they for example 
categorize the regions as “overlaid, unstructured, pre- and proto-complexes, or security complexes 
(...)” (ibid.: 472). Although this makes the practice of comparing regions easier, it can be argued to 
signify a reductionist approach to the analysis of RSCs with the categories already predefined.  
 
Buzan and Wæver not only describe present RSCs but also attempt to predict future RSC scenarios 
(cf. ibid.: 105ff, 172ff, 259ff, 340, 437ff). Through their framework, they seek to predict the possible 
transformations of RSCs by examining the interplay between anarchy, diverse geography and by 
considering both material and discursive factors (ibid.: 67, 88). This predictive method has also been 
taken up by other scholars. Yamin for instance attempts to predict the security relations in 
Afghanistan post-2014 (Yamin 2013: 154f). However, Yamin also explicitly advocates for solutions 
to the Afghan situation (ibid.: 140), whereas, Buzan and Wæver seem to primarily be engaging in a 
descriptive study of the RSCs. 
The attempt to make predictions seems somewhat paradoxical considering the incorporation of 
constructivism that was outlined in the theoretical section. Such predictions can potentially be 
relevant when designing policies. However, if a securitization only exists when it is articulated, how 
can it then be predicted? 
 
Recapitulation 
We have in the preceding section reviewed the methods applied by the CS and other scholars that 
have analyzed empirical material in relation to the concepts of securitization and RSCs. In our reading 
of the literature, we have identified a lack of transparency in the methods of the CS, which makes it 
difficult to review and evaluate them. This gap will be elaborated on in the following section. In spite 
of this issue certain methods have been identified. Characteristic for the empirical studies based on 
the concept of securitization is a method of linguistic analysis of security discourses. We have in this 
section shown that the CS’ intersubjective perception of security has inspired many scholars to 
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conduct discourse analysis of security issues using the concept of securitization. The empirical basis 
for analysis when identifying securitizations are, according to the CS, speech acts uttered by dominant 
political actors. However, we have illustrated how this is increasingly challenged both in relation to 
mediums incorporated in the analysis and actors considered. This is another point that will be 
specified in the following section of the review. In the empirical research on RSCs, a multilevel 
approach to case studies, including historical trajectories, seem to be the predominant method applied 
by both the CS and other scholars. In these case studies, various methods and empirical sources of 
analysis have been introduced by different scholars including interviews and document analysis. 
Significant for the RSCT is the comparative method, which allows for comparison between the case 
studies and predictions of future scenarios.  
 
In both the theoretical and method section, we have pointed to several dimensions of the framework, 
which have been left unanswered by the CS including the narrow conception of the speech act and 
the lack of transparency in their methods. These aspects will be more thoroughly discussed in the 
following section on gaps and tensions in the literature.  
 
Gaps and Tensions in The Copenhagen School - Future Directions and Remaining Agendas 
In the above two sections, the main concepts and methodological approaches in the CS have been 
presented and the implications they have had for the literature have been identified. In the process of 
reviewing the literature on and by the CS, certain remaining gaps and unanswered questions can be 
identified, which suggest directions for future research. This section will reflect on these, focusing 
on three aspects that will structure the following part of the review: speech acts, a territorialist 
perspective and a lack of an explicit methodology. We will argue that these aspects are central in 
order to address and overcome the disparity between the CS’ theoretical framework, their applied 
methods and their potential to grasp the security dynamics in the contemporary world.  
  
The Narrow Conception of the ‘Act’ 
We have in the previous two sections elaborated on the centrality of speech acts, which is a recurring 
concept in the literature by and on the CS7. Interestingly, the concept of speech acts seems to present 
a paradox in the framework: on the one hand, it enables “(...) an almost indefinite expansion of the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!
7 See for example McSweeney (1996); Huysmans (1998) Hansen (2000); Williams (2003); Balzacq (2005); Stritzel 
(2007); McDonald (2008) and Wilkinson (2007).!
! 19!
security agenda”, as it is possible to articulate various referent objects in different sectors. On the 
other hand, the speech act has to be articulated from a powerful position, which limits the scope of 
who can securitize (Williams 2003: 513f). Moreover, a question that can be derived from the debate 
on the CS is: how can the concept of speech act be transcended so that research can move beyond the 
mere linguistic characteristics of securitization, thus contributing to the securitization framework’s 
wider applicability? One dimension of the critique on speech acts therefore points to two, not 
mutually exclusive, aspects; actors as well as the consideration of mediums.  
  
Both McDonald (2008) and Williams (2003) point to how the CS only examine securitization through 
speech acts in formal political activities (Williams 2003: 512; McDonald 2008: 564). In continuation 
hereof, a primary focus on the linguistic and rhetorical characteristics of speech acts in the articulation 
of security risks neglecting the importance of other forms of representations in securitization. This 
overlooks the versatile forms of contemporary political communication, such as images and televisual 
media, and their contribution to securitization (Williams 2003: 512). 
 
This gap has been sought accommodated by for instance Möller (2007) and Hansen (2011), as 
elaborated in the method section, through their analysis of images in the identification of a security 
discourse. However, it could be argued that the acknowledgement of other types of acts than the 
speech act have not yet been fully incorporated in the theory presented by the CS8. The relation 
between speech acts and the different forms of non-linguistic articulations has not been thoroughly 
researched, a point also highlighted by Wæver as an important future research agenda (Wæver 2011: 
473). The specific ways in which these different forms of articulations might contribute to a security 
discourse, and how the various mediums might affect securitizations in particular ways, suggests a 
focus for future research. 
 
The limitations in the linguistic perception of the speech act is further elaborated by Huysmans (2006) 
who emphasizes the importance of supplementing linguistic articulations with “(...) technological 
artefacts and knowledge (...)” when examining the framing of security and insecurity (Huysmans 
2006: 8). Wæver argues that such a perspective presumes technology to be exogenous to the 
construction of security, as no security has objective existence. Consequently, the intersubjective 
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8!Wæver (2011) seems to acknowledge other types of acts such as images, however, we do not see this as sufficiently 
incorporated in the CS’ theory, because it is presented as a part of speech acts.!
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character of security that is central to the CS might be overlooked: “If the securitization form is the 
definition that allow us to ‘observe‘ security, how does he [Huysmans] then see these new forms of 
security and know that they are security?” (Wæver 2011: 473).  
However, Huysmans focus on how technologies are used in order to strengthen a specific discourse 
and therefore arguably supplement the constructivist approach reflected in the CS. More specifically, 
Huysmans’ framework enables an analysis of securitization to incorporate actions that are not 
necessarily explicitly articulated but still contributes to a particular securitization. An example of this 
could be border security technologies, such as those used by the European Union in relation to 
immigration and asylum (Huysmans 2006: 95). Implicit in the use of these technologies are different 
ways of categorizing and profiling migrants that contribute to the construction of them as risks (ibid.: 
101) and in some cases, one could argue, even enhances a particular securitization.  
Hereby, an analysis of technologies within the CS’ framework would go beyond the mere focus on 
the moment of securitization, and as such include actions that are not part of the articulated strategic 
and public political framing. This practical dimension falls outside the concept of speech acts but can 
be argued to be important in order to make a holistic analysis of a specific securitization.  
 
The second aspect of the focus on speech acts relates to the securitizing actor and the question of who 
is in a position to securitize. As mentioned in the method section, Wæver has pointed to the 
importance of dominant institutional voices for the articulation of security, which has been criticized 
for the democratic shortcoming of excluding marginalized actors’ contribution to the construction of 
security. From this perspective, it seems pertinent to acknowledge the dual dynamics in a speech act: 
as an attempt to fix meaning, it necessarily excludes other potential meanings (Hansen 2000: 306).  
 
Another debate surrounding the CS relates to their lack of a normative standpoint when analyzing a 
securitization9. McDonald argues that a normative view, which incorporates abilities for 
emancipatory change would add an important dimension to the CS’ work (McDonald 2008: 582). 
Even though Wæver incorporates the political consequences of securitization analysis in his 2011 
article (cf. Methods Section - Speech Acts), the CS does not reflect on possible democratic deficits 
resulting from a securitization (Watson 2011: 5). Another shortcoming resulting from the CS’ focus 
on political actors is arguably that the theory neglects the role that the audience has for successful 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!
9!For further perspectives on this gap please refer to Eriksson (1999); Huysmans (2006).!
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securitization, as the actual negotiation process about what constitutes security is not adequately 
elaborated on by the school (Balzacq 2005: 173; Pace 2006: 6; McDonald 2008: 572). 
As such, future research should continue to focus on how citizens might influence securitization 
processes through their linguistic articulation of a security threat and practical responses to it.  
 
The critique that we have presented on the concept of ‘the act’ implies that there is a theoretical gap 
with empirical implications. The CS’ framework could be strengthened if it perceived securitization 
as part of a wider process constituted by formal political actors as well as citizens, using a wide range 
of mediums. 
 
Limitations to the Territorial Perspective 
The CS has continuously had a state-centered focus, which has left an empirical gap in their analysis 
of security dynamics (cf. Theoretical Section - Regional Security Complexes).  Specifically, 
transnational threats such as international terrorism have been categorized as territorially bound 
(Buzan and Wæver 2003: 461) and therefore downplayed in empirical research. 
In Regions and Powers (2003), Buzan and Wæver argue that international terrorists often have a 
home base, a territorial ‘home’, and that the agenda of terrorists is closely linked to both domestic 
and regional politics (ibid.: 466f). The following paragraphs will elaborate on how the CS’ framework 
needs further elaboration to account for transnational empirical phenomena, such as international 
terrorism, in order to comprehend the dynamics in the contemporary world.  
 
With the concept of macrosecuritization, the CS has sought to illustrate how the perception of a threat, 
and the political consequences of it, can exist above the state level (Buzan 2006; Buzan and Wæver 
2009). Furthermore, Buzan and Wæver argue in Regions and Powers (2003) that transnational threats 
such as international terrorism cannot existentially challenge the territorial dynamics at the regional 
level as they remain domestically bound (Buzan and Wæver 2003: 466f). Based on the above 
remarks, one could argue that Buzan and Wæver do not perceive transnational phenomena as 
sufficiently noteworthy to be the focal point of analysis. 
 
Following the logic of the CS, it would seem that two questions need to be addressed in future 
research: how does the dynamics of transnational threats show themselves at the local level? And can 
they challenge the territorial dynamics? One could question whether Buzan and Wæver’s 
assumptions, that threats travel easier over short distances (ibid.: 461), is valid in the increasingly 
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interconnected world where territory and distance have become fluid. Do transnational phenomena 
in the form of terrorist organizations, such as the Islamic State (IS), global warming or the Ebola 
pandemic, not challenge territorial dynamics and the locality of such threats? One could certainly 
question whether phenomena such as these suggest a shortcoming in the CS framework's ability to 
fully comprehend the dynamics in the contemporary world.  
 
Claire Wilkinson is one of the scholars that points to the CS’ lack of empirical focus on non-state 
actors at the sub state level, which she sees as a result of high politics being the main analytical 
concern (Wilkinson 2007: 15). She further emphasizes that the CS is Western-centric in its outset10, 
having the Euro-American state model and political culture as an implicit assumption (ibid.: 7). 
Wilkinson argues that while the CS’ framework can potentially grasp referent objects at the level 
above the state and sub state level, it faces certain limitations when assessing security relations in 
Second and Third World countries due to its Western-centric vantage point. This questions the 
universality of the CS’ concepts, as the assumed “(...) degree of continuity, stability and cohesion 
(...)” across generations and strong institutions in the West are not as present in other parts of the 
world (ibid.: 10). An implication of this is that the CS’ ability to grasp international terrorism is 
limited. Thus, one might argue that the current role of the IS in the Middle East region and the reasons 
for its emergence cannot be fully comprehended within these concepts.  
 
Furthermore, the CS’ assumptions regarding geographical proximity face some limitations, as IS has 
recently taken responsibility for attacks in France (Nossiter et al. 14/11/15) and sympathizers with IS 
have performed attacks in the US (Aisch et al. 10/12/15). In the case of IS and their attacks, while 
they were not conventional military attacks, one could challenge the assumption of the difficulty of 
threats to travel over long distances. Thus, it can be argued that the threat of non-state actors, such as 
the one that IS poses, challenge that assumption and thereby indicates a shortcoming in the theoretical 
framework that does not account for this. However, the threat from IS also clearly illustrates the 
importance of geographical proximity, since the violence and bloodshed to a large extent is limited 
to the Middle East (Barnard 12/11/15; Yourish et al. 7/12/15). 
While one could make the argument that the threat from IS and other terrorist organizations still 
travels easier over short distances, the claim of how these cannot transform the territorial dynamics 
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10 See also Kelly (2007) and Bilgin (2011).!
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existentially is interesting, especially in the light of IS and its conquering of Iraqi and Syrian territory, 
as this is an example of a transnational actor that operates within conventional territorial dynamics of 
an RSC. It can be argued that this is a case of transformation of the territorial dynamics; how can one 
predict a future scenario of this particular RSC when such organizations are largely ignored?  
 
The case of the Ebola pandemic is another example of a transnational threat that can challenge the 
territorialist assumption. International health emergencies are not traditional security issues. 
However, the international classification as such and the US deployment of troops in West Africa, 
directed at building Ebola virus treatment centers and military coordination facilities, indicate a high 
level of securitization that can be explained by the risk of an actual epidemic domestically in the US 
(Davis 15/10/14). In an increasingly interconnected world, these issues, among others, arguably 
require further elaboration from the CS in light of the transnational phenomena and non-state actors 
that is increasingly difficult to grasp with their territorialist perspective and Western-centric vantage 
point. This gap in the literature of the CS remain both rather unexplored and unquestioned to date, 
even though the CS has been accused for being too state-centric in its grasp of security dynamics11. 
Here, the CS could benefit from incorporating these contemporary dynamics, as they challenge one 
of the significant assumptions in their perspective on transnational threats. 
 
Questioning the Transparency of the Copenhagen School 
In our review of the literature on and by the CS, the lack of an explicit methodology appears to be a 
central gap. As was elaborated on in the method section, several questions need to be addressed in 
relation to this: How does the CS find the concrete discourses they examine and how do they select 
which discourses to analyze? As outlined throughout this review, some of the primary critiques of 
the CS’ framework point to the narrowness of the concepts. The critics argue that there are a range 
of actors and referent objects that the CS ignores, intentionally excludes or basically fail to grasp. 
The gap pointed to here is found in continuation of this and relates to what the CS actually 
comprehend, or not, in their studies. 
 
An example of how Buzan and Wæver are not explicit about their methods, is in the examination of 
the case studies in Regions and powers (2003) where there appears to be a lack of transparency in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!
11 In relation to the critique of the CS’ state-centrism, see for example: Williams (2003); Hoogensen (2005); Pace 
(2006); McDonald (2008); Bilgin (2011); Gad and Petersen (2011); Roe (2012).!
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terms of what empirical sources they work with and how these contribute to the analysis. This has 
the implication that their findings are very hard to validate. An example of that is the refutable claim: 
“In Africa, pan-Africanism never developed much beyond background symbolics. (...) and was largely 
sustained as a unity of negatives against South Africa’s apartheid regime (...)” (Buzan and Wæver 
2003: 186). Although Buzan and Wæver, as mentioned in the method section, argue for generalizing 
securitizations in order to illustrate a global picture, it does seem to undermine the legitimacy of 
certain conclusions. This tendency is further underlined in the definition of the Moroccan annexation 
of Western Sahara in 1975 as “The main regional security problem (...)” (ibid.: 193). Without 
dismissing this claim as such, one could still question by which measurements it is understood as the 
‘main’ issue. Thus, an execution of a similar case study could be difficult and although the work is 
original, further research should be dedicated to how the framework can be made more transparent 
and critically reflexive.  
 
The lack of an explicit methodology is not only evident in the scholars’ work on RSCs but likewise 
in their studies of securitizations. In relation to this, the previously mentioned single case study Buzan 
(2006), conducted on the GWoT, leaves many unanswered questions in regards to the applied 
methods. The legitimacy of a macrosecuritization, just as with securitizations, depends on an audience 
(Buzan 2006: 1102). However, Buzan is unclear in the definition of how this legitimacy is obtained. 
Furthermore, he does not enunciate which analytical tools and methods he uses in order to evaluate 
the audience’s acceptance of the macrosecuritization. This can be seen as further problematic 
considering the claim that “(...) it is the actor, not the analyst, who decides whether something is to 
be handled as an existential threat” (Buzan et al. 1998: 34). It could be questioned if it is possible to 
evaluate whether it is actually the actor and not the analyst who has identified the threat when the 
steps taken to identify a securitization are not revealed. Thus, the role of the analyst as a neutral 
observer is not as evident as the scholars of the CS present it to be. The consequence deriving from 
the CS actually deciding, or constructing, what should be handled as a securitization has the 
implication that they themselves become a part of the discourse. That is, they as analysts also 
contribute to the construction of external threats or emergency measures, which contradicts the 
standard they themselves set in the quote above.  
 
In Security: A New Framework for Analysis (1998), it is further argued that one of the purposes of 
the CS’ theory is to enable other scholars to normatively evaluate a specific securitization, its 
! 25!
advantages and disadvantages (ibid.: 34). However, when they are not explicit about the indicators 
they use in order to interpret securities, they do not provide the necessary analytical tools that would 
make a potential problematization of securitizations possible. As such, they do not provide a vantage 
point from which to exercise criticism. Consequently, it becomes difficult to appraise and discuss 
securitizations. In other words, the CS points to the importance of analyzing how security is 
constructed through speech acts but they are not necessarily clear on the methods applied in order to 
grasp this construction.  
 
Another example of how the CS is not explicit about their methods is reflected in the work with 
sectors. They are not explicit about what defines a sector, that is: what place a security issue in a 
specific sector? Is a sector for instance defined by its referent objects? Or by how the perceived 
security issue is managed? This is the same critique Pace points to, when she in her text ask the CS: 
“What is and what is not a sector?” (Pace 2006: 7) When the reader is not told exactly how the CS 
works with sectors, it also gets difficult to differentiate between them. Hereby, it might be unclear 
which threats belong to which sectors and how these might overlap (ibid.).  
 
The consequence of the CS’ lack of transparency in their applied methods is that their reliability can 
be questioned in the empirical application of the concepts. When the scholars of the CS are not 
explicit about which tools they use to identify security issues, or how these tools are applied, the 
actual research and the validity of it becomes somewhat blurry.  
 
Recapitulation 
We have in this section argued that future research needs to address three gaps in order to overcome 
the disparity between the CS’ theoretical framework and their potential to grasp contemporary 
security issues. This argument has been articulated through a focus on three aspects: speech acts, a 
territorialist perspective and the methods used by the CS. The review of the concept of speech acts 
revealed a gap in terms of the narrow perception of an act only articulated linguistically in formal 
political settings. It was proposed that future contributions to the work of the CS should elaborate on 
what constitutes an act and therefore contribute to a securitization. This includes further consideration 
of different kinds of act articulated through different mediums, actions and technologies. Here, it is 
essential that the different consequences of particular types of acts in a securitization process are also 
elaborated upon. This would allow the CS to grasp the practical non-linguistic dimensions of 
securitization processes.  
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Furthermore, our review of the territorialist perspective revealed that the RSCT likewise needs to be 
revisited in order to fully grasp current global dynamics; especially if the school is to explain 
transnational threats. We therefore posit that future research should diverge from the state-centered 
analyses of the CS and incorporate non-state actors and non-state threats, such as epidemics, in its 
theoretical approach, in order to grasp contemporary security dynamics. This could be done by 
drawing further on complex interdependence theory as this strand of neoliberalism to a greater extent 
incorporates non-state actors and give these actors more agency. 
 
We have, in the last section, included a critical evaluation of the methods used in the application of 
the framework and argued that as a result of a lack of transparency, it is difficult to follow the methods 
applied by the CS in regards to securitization and RSC analysis. Consequently, a specification of the 
methods is needed in order to move future research forward.  
 
Conclusion 
In this literature review, we have focused on the CS’ concepts of securitization and regional security 
complexes. We have argued that there is a disparity between the CS’ theoretical framework, their 
applied methods and their potential to grasp the security dynamics in the contemporary world. This 
disparity was a result of three significant gaps emerging from of our reading of the work of and by 
the CS; gaps that point to future research agendas that should be addressed in order to move the 
framework forward. 
  
The first gap was identified in the process of reviewing the CS’ literature on securitization and 
concerns the concept of speech acts. In the theoretical section, we underlined how the contribution of 
securitization adds a significant dimension to security studies by widening the scope for research. 
The incorporation of speech acts has the potential of encompassing security issues outside the 
political and military sector. According to the reasoning behind securitization, security issues do not 
have an objective existence but are constructed through linguistic articulations by dominant 
institutional actors. However, after reviewing the debate on the CS, it is evident that critics have 
pointed to certain limitations within the perception of the act, both pertaining to the question of who 
can securitize and in relation to how a securitization can be articulated. Critics argue that by solely 
considering speech acts, the CS excludes other forms of acts that also affect securitizations such as 
images. Additionally, by centering the analysis on securitizing actors in formal political settings, the 
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CS arguably neglect the voices of less politically prominent, marginalized actors. The focus of the 
CS is surely important but they only grasp some of the contemporary dynamics. Consequently, 
pertaining to our overall argument, we have pointed out that security dynamics in the contemporary 
world are influenced by a range of different mediums and actors, which must therefore also be 
considered. 
  
A second gap was identified from the overall critique of the CS being implicitly Western-centric and 
having an explicit territorial focus. As outlined in the theoretical section, one of the main assumptions 
in the RSCT is how states are linked regionally in autonomous complexes. In continuation of this, we 
have pointed to a gap concerning the role of transnational threats and actors. Although, the theoretical 
framework acknowledges the existence of these phenomena, they have not received much empirical 
prominence and their role is downplayed by the CS. Relating that to the overall argument, there is a 
disparity between their theoretical framework and their potential to grasp contemporary transnational 
security dynamics such as Islamic State and the Ebola pandemic, which challenge the notion of how 
these threats cannot existentially challenge territorial dynamics. 
  
A third gap, identified in the method section, relates to both securitization, RSCT and more generally 
to the empirical work of the CS. In our review of case studies and the discourse analytical method 
applied to securitizations, a lack of transparency in the CS’ methods was evident. This results in 
inconsistencies between the theoretical framework and the methods applied by the scholars. It is 
simply not evident which steps have been taken to reach the conclusions made by Buzan and Wæver 
in for instance Regions and Power (2003) or by Buzan (2006) in his article on the macrosecuritization 
of the GWoT. This has the implication that the reliability of the scholars can be questioned since their 
findings cannot as such be validated. In relation to the overall argument, it can be difficult to apply 
their framework to contemporary issues since it is not clear how to examine, discuss and problematize 
the specific securitizations and security dynamics. Consequently, it appears from our review that there 
is a disparity between the defined concepts and the undefined methods.  
  
These gaps point to the necessity of future research to specify and elaborate on the understanding of 
acts in order to enhance the perception of how different securitizing actors might contribute to 
contemporary security dynamics. Future research must further consider the role of transnational 
security dynamics, especially at the regional level. Additionally, the CS must present its methods in 
a more transparent manner. Such a research agenda also has a wider relevance for security studies, 
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the IR field and the topic of global power reconfigurations and regional security challenges; a topic 
that needs to be further explored and discussed as global politics are constantly faced with changing 
power dynamics. When first considering global power reconfigurations it might seem logical to 
review how classic IR schools analyze these dynamics. However, the CS offers some explanatory 
value as it presents a different take on the topic with its combination of a neorealist and a 
constructivist approach. Consequently, we have in this review sought to move beyond the traditional 
understanding of global power reconfigurations by examining the CS’ potential for grasping these 
developments. The CS recognizes the increased prominence of the regional level to be a significant 
power reconfiguration after the Cold War and dedicate their studies to enhance the understanding of 
the security dynamics on this level. As described in the introduction, we see the increased prominence 
of transnational threats and non-state actors as a significant global power reconfiguration in the 
contemporary world. When acknowledging the significance of the regional level, as the CS does, it 
seems pertinent to also address how other power reconfigurations affect the dynamics at this level. In 
this review, we have shown that whereas the CS’ work attests to the prominence of the regional level 
it does not extensively study transnational dynamics. This is what we propose should be done when 
arguing that the CS must further research the implications of transnational security dynamics in order 
to fully grasp the contemporary global power reconfigurations and their influence on regional security 
challenges today. A stronger perception of the ‘act’ is likewise needed in order to extend the research 
agenda to cover these dynamics. Securitizations pertaining to transnational security issues are 
arguably more comprehensively grasped through for instance the study of images and violent acts. 
Additionally, in order to deal with transnational dynamics, it is essential to know which tools to apply 
to empirical material. Therefore, an explicit set of methods is a precondition for future research. 
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